

National Security Council Files

1943 Middle East War, 9 October, 1943 — File No. 4

[1 of 2]

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	cable	Amemb Amman to Sec State (6 pp) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-62/24	10/9/73	B
2	telegram	Sec State to Amemb London, et. al. (2 pp) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-62/25	10/9/73	B
3	report	Intelligence Information Cable (3 pp) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-62/26	10/9/73	B
4	report	Intelligence Information Cable (4 pp) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-62/27	10/13/73	B
5	reports	Situation Reports (7 pp) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-62/28	10/9/73	B
6	report	Intelligence Information Cable (3 pp) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-62/29 Duplicate NLN 04-03/6	10/9/73	B
7	report	Central Intelligence Bulletin (8 pp) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-62/30 Duplicate NLN 04-03/7	10/9/73	B
FILE GROUP TITLE			BOX NUMBER	
NSC Files, Harold H. Saunders Files: Middle East Negotiations Files			1173	
FOLDER TITLE				
(7) 1973 Middle East War File 4 October 9, 1973 [1 of 2]				

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.	E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
B. National security classified information.	F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.	G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
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SECRET (GDS)

October 9, 1973

For the President

TALKING POINTS

The Middle East Situation

1. I want to give you some background on our role in the current Middle East crisis. First, it is important to understand that neither we nor the Israelis knew in advance of the Arab plan to attack. We had queried the Israelis about indications of increased Syrian and Egyptian preparedness, but each time the Israelis gave a defensive interpretation to these moves. We had no reason to doubt their judgment.
2. On Saturday morning, Prime Minister Meir contacted us with new information of an impending Arab attack. We immediately tried to contact all parties to prevent hostilities from breaking out. When war started, both we and the Israelis were caught by surprise. We did not stop Israel from doing anything she was preparing to do, and in fact the Israelis volunteered the information that they had no intention to attack first.
3. Since fighting began, our major efforts have concentrated on insuring that the Soviet Union would not become involved in any way. I have had several exchanges with General-Secretary Brezhnev and can report that the Soviet leadership has behaved with restraint thus far. We have been encouraged by this development, but we remain very alert for any signs of change in Soviet posture.
4. As you know, we called for a Security Council meeting and Ambassador Scali in his speech described our general position on a ceasefire. We have not tabled a resolution yet, since none of the parties seems willing to accept a ceasefire, but our feeling is that the best outcome would be for both sides to return to the positions they held before the fighting.
5. Dr. Kissinger can brief you in more detail on the current diplomatic context.

SECRET (GDS)

10/9/73

Outside
System

October 9, 1973

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

William Polk of the University of Chicago called with the following message that you may want to mention to Secretary Kissinger.

Polk feels that the Egyptians may be in a mood to talk seriously about a peace settlement, assuming a ceasefire in place can be arranged soon. He offered his services if he could be of any help and asked if it might be possible for him to talk with Dr. Kissinger or see him in the next few days. I discouraged him on the latter points but, knowing his personal relationship with Dr. Kissinger, I promised to pass on the message.

William B. Quandt

WBQ:tmt 10/9/73

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

5640

SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

October 9, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: WILLIAM B. QUANDT W.B. 2.
SUBJECT: Middle Eastern Issues

Today's developments suggest that our generally optimistic estimates of the outcome of the fighting could be wrong in several key areas. I mention these only because I sense that we have been caught by surprise too often in the last few days and we may now be at the point of having to face up to some difficult decisions.

The important facts that seem to emerge from today's fighting are the following:

--Israel, while generally regaining the initiative, is taking heavy losses and fighting seems likely to drag on for several more days.

--Threats to American citizens, which previously has not been noted in the Arab countries, have surfaced in Lebanon. If Israel bombs civilian areas in Damascus and Cairo, anti-American sentiment could flare up rapidly. [See Ambassador Buffum's cable at Tab A.]

--Oil from Iraq and Saudi Arabia that is normally shipped by pipeline across Lebanon and Syria is blocked. Kuwait is calling for the use of oil as part of the battle.

--Reports that Israeli bombing has caused Soviet casualties in Damascus raise the possibility that Soviet moderation could rapidly shift to a policy of military support via arms shipment to Syria and Egypt. [See Tab C.]

Supply began
10/10

XGDS - 3

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

Good presentation

--Urgent Israeli arms requests raise an acute dilemma of acting either too soon or too late in terms of our later ability to deal with either Arabs or Israelis in any future peace settlement effort.

--Jordan seems to be drawing closer to possible involvement in the fighting, to judge from the highly emotional tone of King Hussein's reply to your message. [Tab B]

In light of these possible developments, the following decisions may have to be faced soon:

1. Evacuation of American citizens from Lebanon. This could probably still be done by commercial carriers in a relatively orderly manner. Timing is obviously of critical importance.

--On the one hand this would signal heightened US concern at a time when we may want to present a more confident image. If a ceasefire is achieved tomorrow, there may be no need for such a move.

--On the other hand, if the Arabs face a massive defeat in the next few days, it may be better to begin to get Americans out of Lebanon tomorrow, before attacks on them begin.

2. Ceasefire

--As fighting goes on indecisively, our own interests become increasingly exposed and Jordan runs the risk of being drawn in. Most of our Ambassadors in the Arab world seem to feel the best outcome we can hope for now is an immediate ceasefire.

--Until the Israelis have recovered lost territory, there may not be much we can do to stop them, even if we chose to do so. The balance of gains and losses on this issue is increasingly close. If we call for an immediate end to the fighting, we will irritate the Israelis, which may mean a loss of influence in future negotiations. If we do not manage to end the fighting soon, however, our relations with the Arabs and possibly even the Soviets could suffer.

3. Israeli Arms Requests

--If we act too early or too visibly on this key issue, we will insure attacks on US citizens and an oil embargo in key Arab states.

--If we refrain from action at a time of genuine Israeli need, we cannot expect much Israeli confidence in us after the fighting is over.

4. The Soviet Role

If the Israelis inflict casualties on Soviet citizens in Syria or deal a devastating blow to the Arabs, the Soviets will be under strong pressure to react by resupplying arms to their clients and generally striking a more militant posture.

5. Oil

If oil exports to Western Europe from Arab countries are cut by 1.6 m. b. p. d. as reported, we must expect an announcement of export controls on oil products from Europe. This will create shortages in the US this winter. We should be prepared to issue a statement on rationing if necessary in the next few days.

The key problem that emerges from this analysis is whether we should consider altering our position on a ceasefire. In favor of doing so in the direction of simply stopping the fighting as soon as possible are the prospects for increasingly serious threats to US interests if the fighting is prolonged many more days. The price of pushing for a ceasefire in place would probably be an agreement with the Israelis on strong military and diplomatic support after the ceasefire, which may complicate later efforts at an overall settlement. On balance, however, this might be judged worth the cost, unless tomorrow the Israelis can recover lost territory. By Thursday, we may need to consider a shift in our policy on this key issue. As painful as it might be, the alternatives may not look all that attractive.

Tab A

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L *****S C O P Y

PRIORITY

ESA541AAA854

DE RUESRE #1953 2821430

P 091350Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4653
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 8331
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 2346
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 5829
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 4205
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 4517
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 11953

DEPT PASS USINT CAIRO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PMIL, PINS, XF, LE

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN LEBANON - SITREP NO. 2

BEGIN SUMMARY: SITUATION HERE APPEARS GROWING MORE TENSE
AS FIGHTING CONTINUES BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAEL. SURFACE CALM,
BUT NERVOUSNESS AMONG POPULATION INCREASING. LEFTIST DEMON-
STRATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE AND EXPECTED GROW IN SIZE AND NUMBER.
FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY, INCLUDING POSSIBLE TERRORISM AND ATTACKS ON
AMERICAN INTERESTS, ON INCREASE. END SUMMARY.

1. AS OF MID-MORNING OF OCT 9 SITUATION IN LEBANON CALM IN
APPEARANCE AND PRETTY MUCH BUSINESS-AS-USUAL WHILE POLITICAL
ELEMENTS TRIED TO ASSESS SIGNIFICANCE OF BATTLE BETWEEN EGYPT,
SYRIA AND ISRAEL. SCHOOLS AND BUSINESSES OPEN AS USUAL ALTHOUGH
FEWER PEOPLE ON STREETS. SOME AIRLINES HAVE STOPPED FLIGHTS,
PARTICULARLY THOSE FROM EAST (E.G. PAKISTAN, JORDAN, ETC.), BUT
MOST FLIGHTS ARRIVING AND DEPARTING ON SCHEDULE. SOME FLIGHTS
DIVERTING VIA TURKEY TO AND FROM EAST UNTIL SYRIAN AIRSPACE
CONSIDERED SAFE. BOTH IPC AND TAPLINE OPERATING AT ABOUT 50
PERCENT OF CAPACITY SINCE FIGHTING BEGAN IN ORDER MINIMIZE
LOSSES SHOULD PILOTS THROUGH SYRIA AND GOLAN BE HIT. EXPORTS
DOWN SINCE IPC TERMINAL AT BANYAS, SYRIA CLOSED AND TWO IN
LEBANON REDUCING EXPORTS TO KEEP ADEQUATE STOCKS ON HAND FOR
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PSN:052598

RECALLED
PAGE 01

TDR:282/15:25Z DTG:091350Z OCT 73

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L *****S C O P Y

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MEASURES, ALTHOUGH NUMBER OF ARMY AND POLICE CONTROLS IN BEIRUT HAS INCREASED CONSIDERABLY.

2. MORNING OCT 9, EXPECTED SIGNS OF POLITICAL TENSION HAVE GEGAN TO APPEAR. DEMONSTRATION HELD AT LOCAL UNIVERSITY AT WHICH FATAH LEADER TOLD 300 STUDENTS FEDAYEEN WOULD STRIKE AT "AMERICAN INTERESTS" THROUGHOUT MIDDLE EAST. SMALL DEMONSTRATION REPORTED AT JORDANIAN EMBASSY, DEMANDING THAT JORDAN ENTER BATTLE. LARGE DEMONSTRATION PLANNED FOR AFTERNOON OCT 9 BY VARIOUS LEFTIST POLITICAL GROUPS AND FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS, CALLING ON GOL TO PROVIDE MORE SUPPORT FOR SYRIA, TO PROVIDE FULL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND OTHER AID FOR FEDAYEEN TO ATTACK ISRAEL, AND TO ALLOW FULL FREEDOM OF POLITICAL ACTION BY "PROGRESSIVE FORCES". DIRECTOR GENERAL OF SURETE TOLD EMBOFF EVENING OF OCT 8 THAT HE EXPECTED LEFTIST DEMONSTRATIONS AND PROBABLY ATTEMPTS BY FEDAYEEN TO ATTACK AMERICAN EMBASSY. ARMY G-2 REPORTS A SERIOUS FEDAYEEN THREAT AGAINST AMERICAN AND POSSIBLY OTHER DIPLOMATS (BEIRUT 11925 AND 11930).

3. GOL OFFICIALS UNEASY ABOUT THREAT OF ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION IN RESPONSE TO FEDAYEEN ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAEL, EVEN THOUGH MOST OF FEDAYEEN ACTION HAS BEEN BLUSTER AND MORTAR AND ROCKET ROUNDS FIRED HAVE NOT BEEN NUMEROUS OR WELL AIMED. THEY EXPECT CONTINUING FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY, INCLUDING TERRORISM, AS FEDAYEEN STRIVE TO SHOW THEY NOT COMPLETELY OVERSHADOWED BY REGULAR ARAB ARMIES. SHOULD FEDAYEEN BECOME TOO ACTIVE, DESPITE EFFORTS CONTROL THEM, IDF RIPOSTE COULD GREATLY EXACERBATE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION. GOL OFFICIALS NOTE THAT SUNNI MOSLEM MUFTI CONSPICUOUSLY ABSENT FROM HLYNÝ NATIONAL LEADERS WHO HAVE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR GOL POLICIES AND PRESIDENT FRANGIE DURING PERIOD OF CRISIS. LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER OFFICIALS CONTINUE EFFORTS CONVINCE ARAB AMBASSADORS AND THOSE OF MAJOR POWERS THAT LEBANON FOLLOWING CORRECT POLICY IN NOT PARTICIPATING IN ANY WAY AND TRYING NOT BE DRAGGED INTO

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*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****S COPY

Tab B

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 1 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

SAUNDERS

Tab C

HAK, Scowcroft - 1.1

Soviet Embassy in
Damascus hit.

104

MIDEAST-SOVIET EMBASSY

NEW YORK (AP)-CBS RADIO SAID TODAY THAT ISRAELI PLANES SCORED A
DIRECT HIT ON THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY IN DAMASCUS, SYRIA. THE NETWORK QUOTE:

A SOVIET DIPLOMAT AS SAYING 30 RUSSIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN,
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INFILCTED TREMENDOUS DAMAGE.

BRELIS SAID A HOSPITAL ALSO WAS HIT AND THAT THERE WERE CIVILIAN
CASUALTIES IN OTHER PARTS OF THE SYRIAN CAPITAL AS A RESULT OF HITS
ON APARTMENT HOUSES AND PRIVATE HOMES.

WE321PED OCT 9

Sit Room comment: U.S. intelligence community unable to
refute or confirm this report at this
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SAUNDERS

HAK, Scowcroft - L.L.

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BYAUTN - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

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RECD: 09 OCT '73 9:20PM

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0051
BT

SECRET TEL AVIV 7919

NODIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, US, XF, UK
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH BRITISH AMBASSADOR

REF: A. TEL AVIV 7918 AND B. TEL AVIV 7811

AS REPORTED IN REF A, BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND I HAD CONVERSATION
AT HIS INITIATIVE MORNING OCT 9. HE DID HIS BEST TO ESTABLISH

DURING CONVERSATION FACT THAT SINCE USNAND UK HAD SO MUCH IN
COMMON RE MID-EAST CRISIS HE AND I SHOULD STAY IN "CLOSE TOUCH."
GIVEN FACT HE AWARE OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN SECRETARY AND
LORD CROMER, I WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT NOT TO MEET WITH HIM ONCE
IN A WHILE SHOULD HE INSIST. THERE IS NO QUESTION, OF COURSE,
ABOUT MY MAINTAINING LINE BETWEEN DISCUSSIONS AND CONSULTATIONS
IN THESE MEETINGS, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY (REF B). IT
WOULD BE HELPFUL, HOWEVER, IF I COULD BE KEPT INFORMED OF OUR
DISCUSSIONS WITH BRITISH IN WASHINGTON AND LONDON IN ORDER TO
HAVE BETTER BACKGROUND FOR INEVITABLE SESSIONS HERE.

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CONTROL: 2281

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0050
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S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7918

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E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, US, XF, UK
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH BRITISH AMBASSADOR

1. AT HIS REQUEST, I MET TODAY WITH UK AMBASSADOR LEDWIDGE, WHO RETURNED LATE LAST NIGHT FROM LONDON. LEDWIDGE INITIATED THE CONVERSATION BY STATING HIS GOVERNMENT HOPED FIGHTING WOULD STOP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER THAT SITUATION WOULD NOT "POSION" RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE ARABS. HE NOTED IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE FIGHTING FROM SPREADING AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT JORDAN AND/OR LEBANON WOULD BE DRAWN INTO THE FIGHTING.

2. AS CONCERNs LEBANON, HE NOTED THAT BOTH US AND UK HAD ALREADY URGED RESTRAINT ON ISRAELIS AND THAT THE FRENCH HAD ALSO INDICATED THEY WOULD DO LIKEWISE. AS CONCERNs UK DEMARCHE, LEDWIDGE STATED ISRAELI RESPONSE WAS FAIRLY POSITIVE WHILE NOTING GOL HAD RESPONSIBILITIES RE RESTRAINING FEDAYEEN.

3. LEDWIDGE THEN ASKED MY VIEW ON POSSIBLE SOVIET INTENTIONS. IN THIS RESPECT, HE NOTED UK BELIEVES SOVS TRIED TO DISCOURAGE THE EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS AND WHEN THEY COULDN'T, THEY LEFT. I TOLD HIM THIS PRETTY MUCH AGREES WITH OUR ESTIMATE OF SITUATION. HE THEN SWITCHED THE CONVERSATION TO EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN INTENTIONS AND RATHER CURIOUSLY ASKED WHETHER WE BELIEVED THAT SADAT MEANT IT WHEN HE TOLD THE UK AMBASSADOR RECENTLY THAT EGYPT WAS PREPARED TO FIGHT FOR "TEN YEARS." (LEDWIDGE CLAIMS HE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO TELL US THIS SO PLEASE PROTECT. I NOTICE, HOWEVER, THE SAME INFORMATION IS IN CAIRO'S 2987.) HE LUMPED THIS TOGETHER WITH QUESTIONS ON OUR ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS AND WONDERED IF WE THOUGHT SADAT WOULD BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE IF AS A QUID PRO QUO THE ISRAELIS WOULD AGREE NOT TO STRIKE ACROSS THE CANAL. I REPLIED THAT I DON'T THINK SADAT'S STATEMENT SHOULD BE TAKEN LITERALLY, THAT

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WE WOULD PREFER DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BUT WOULD BE HAPPY IF THE PARTIES ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND ALTHOUGH I HOPED SADAT WOULD BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL I HAD NO INFORMATION TO EITHER CONFIRM OR DENY THAT SADAT WOULD BE WILLING TO COME TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE SHOULD THE ISRAELIS EITHER TAKE OR NOT TAKE CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIONS IN CURRENT WAR. IN THIS RESPECT, I SAID IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT A GOOD WAY FOR ISRAEL TO BRING EGYPT TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WOULD BE NOT TO STOP AT THE CANAL BUT TO APPLY INCREASED MILITARY PRESSURE. I NOTED I WASN'T ADVOCATING SUCH A COURSE, BUT MENTIONED IT IN CONTEXT OF HIS QUESTIONS. LEDWIDGE NOTED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD TAKEN A SIMILAR LINE IN A RECENT CONVERSATION IN WASHINGTON WITH LORD CROMER.

4. LEDWIDGE THEN ASKED ME IF WE HAD HEARD THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD LOST CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF TANKS AND AIRCRAFT. I REPLIED MERELY THAT WE KNEW THAT THE WAR HAD RESULTED IN EQUIPMENT LOSSES AS WELL AS THE LOSS OF CONSIDERABLE ISRAELI EQUIPMENT. LEDWIDGE CONTINUED ON THE SUBJECT OF ISRAELI EQUIPMENT LOSSES NOTING THAT THE UK HAD INSTITUTED AN EMBARGO ON SUPPLY OF MILITARY ITEMS TO THE BELLIGERENTS FOR THE DURATION OF THE HOSTILITIES AND WONDERED WHETHER WE HAD ALSO TAKEN SUCH A STEP. I TOLD HIM I WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY SUCH DECISION ON OUR PART.

5. JUST PRIOR TO DEPARTING, LEDWIDGE SAID HE HOPED WE COULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH.

6. COMMENT. IT SEEMS TO ME THE MAIN PURPOSE FOR THIS CALL WAS TO TRY TO GET INFORMATION RE ISRAEL'S EQUIPMENT LOSSES AND AMERICAN RE-SUPPLY INTENTIONS, PROBABLY IN ORDER TO EVALUATE WHAT LEVERAGE THE US MIGHT HAVE OVER THE GOI SHOULD WE DECIDE TO APPLY IT. PRESUMABLY THE BRITS ARE TRYING TO GET THE SAME INFO OUT OF WASHINGTON.

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
SECRET TEL AVIV 7917

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E. O. 11652: XGDS-1
TACS: MASS, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI AMMUNITION NEEDS

CONTROL: 2268Q
RECD: 09 OCT '73 8:11Z

AS DEPARTMENT WILL SEE IN DATT REPORT OF IDF BRIEFING
HE RECEIVED 1300Z TODAY, IDF HAS INDICATED THAT ITS STOCKS
IN CERTAIN AMMUNITION CATEGORIES ARE RUNNING LOW AND GENERAL
TONE OF BRIEFING SOMEWHAT RESTRAINED. IN ORDER
BETTER TO EVALUATE TONE AND SUBSTANCE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
MILITARY INFORMATION WE ARE RECEIVING FROM ISRAELIS, WE WOULD
APPRECIATE KNOWING OF ANY AMMUNITION OR EQUIPMENT REQUESTS GOI MAY
HAVE MADE OR MAY MAKE IN WASHINGTON DURING CURRENT HOSTILITIES.
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SECRET TEL AVIV 7878

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, IS
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION: WHERE DOES US GO FROM HERE

HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELD _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

Receiving on

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1. AS ISRAEL'S FORTUNES IN WAR ARE TAKING TURN FOR BETTER, MOMENT IS APPROACHING WHEN WE MUST DECIDE IF AND HOW US IS TO SEEK TO INFLUENCE ISRAELI ACTIONS AS THEY MAY AFFECT POSTWAR SITUATION IN AREA.

2. WE HAVE HEARD FROM ISRAELI CONTACTS THAT GOI IS INCREASINGLY BEING CRITICIZED PRIVATELY FOR NOT HAVING TAKEN PREEMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION BEFORE ARABS ATTACKED OCTOBER 6 OR/AND FOR NOT HAVING MOBILIZED SOONER. WE CANNOT JUDGE HOW WIDESPREAD THIS CRITICISM IS. HOWEVER, IF AS WAR FAR ISRAELI CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS IN THIS WAR, CRITICISM WILL SPREAD WHEN CASUALTIES BECOME KNOWN. AND WITH ELECTION APPROACHING, GOI WILL BE SENSITIVE.

3. THERE ARE ALREADY CALLS IN PRESS FOR ISRAEL TO ADMINISTER THOROUGH TROUTING TO SYRIA AND EGYPT TO COMPENSATE FOR ISRAEL'S HAVING ALLOWED ITSELF TO BECOME VICTIM OF ARAB ATTACKS. CONCEIVABLY, PRESSURES UPON AND WITHIN GOI MAY MOUNT TO PURSUE ONE OF FOLLOWING TWO SCENARIOS:

(A) ISRAEL DRIVES ALL EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN FORCES BACK BEHIND PRE-OCTOBER 6 CEASEFIRE LINES, THEN IN HOT PURSUIT DESTROYS THEM INSIDE EGYPT AND SYRIA PROPER, AND OCCUPIES SOME



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ADDITIONAL TERRITORY;
(B) ISRAEL DRIVES ALL EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN FORCES BACK BEHIND
PRE-OCTOBER 6 CEASEFIRE LINES, ENGAGES IN HOT PURSUIT IN
SOME INSTANCES AND THEN PULLS THESE ISRAELI FORCES
BACK WITHIN PRE-OCTOBER 6 LINES, BUT THEN CONTINUES AERIAL
ATTACKS ON MILITARY TARGETS IN EGYPT AND SYRIA PROPER FOR
TWO OR THREE ADDITIONAL DAYS.

4. FROM US VIEWPOINT, MASSIVE ISRAELI DESTRUCTION OF
EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN WAR MACHINES AT END OF THIS
WAR OFFERS NO ADVANTAGES THAT WE CAN DISCERN. IT CAN BE
ARGUED THAT PART OF DIFFICULTY IN ACHIEVING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
FOLLOWING 1967 WAR MAY HAVE RESULTED FROM ARAB FEELING
ISRAELIS HAD BEEN LUCKY AND ARABS HAD NOT BEEN THOROUGHLY
DEFEATED. WHATEVER THE CASE, ISRAELI OVERKILL IN THIS INSTANCE
UNLIKELY TO HAVE EFFECT OF INDUCING ARABS TO COME QUICKLY TO
NEGOTIATING TABLE.

5. DISADVANTAGES FROM US VIEWPOINT OF MASSIVE ISRAELI
DESTRUCTION OF EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN WAR MACHINES + AND
CERTAINLY OF ANY ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ADDITIONAL TERRITORY +
SEEM OBVIOUS: HARM WOULD BE DONE TO WHATEVER CHANCES
THERE MAY BE FOR ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT, AND ISRAEL WOULD
LOSE WHATEVER ADVANTAGE WILL OTHERWISE ACCRUE FROM GROWING
INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF FACT THAT ISRAEL WAS VICTIM OF
AGGRESSION IN THIS LATEST WAR.

6. OPTIMUM SCENARIO, AS I SEE IT FROM POINT OF VIEW OF US INTERESTS,
WOULD BE FOR ISRAEL TO DECLARE FORTHWITH, BEFORE END OF WAR, THAT
(A) ISRAEL WISHES IN THIS WAR ONLY TO DRIVE BACK EGYPTIAN AND
SYRIAN FORCES TO PRE-OCTOBER 6 LINES,
NOT TO CRUSH EGYPT AND SYRIA; (B) ISRAEL
WILL STOP SHOOTING ONCE THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED IF OTHER SIDE
ALSO STOPS; (C) ISRAEL INTENDS TO OCCUPY NO ADDITIONAL TERRITORY;
AND (D) ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE AFTER WAR TO SEEK PEACE SETTLEMENT
WITH EGYPT, SYRIA, AND JORDAN UNDER WHICH, AMONG OTHER
THINGS, ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM TERRITORIES
OCCUPIED IN JUNE 1967 WAR TO SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES.

7. FOR REASONS STATED ABOVE, CHANCES OF GETTING GOI TO MAKE
SUCH DECLARATION ARE PROBABLY NOT GOOD, BUT I THINK WE SHOULD



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TRY. ISRAELI DEPENDENCE ON US TO WARD OFF PRESSURES FOR
CEASEFIRE BEFORE EXPULSION OF REMAINING EGYPTIAN FORCES EAST
OF CANAL. AND ISRAELI NEED AFTER THIS WAR FOR ADDITIONAL
MILITARY HARDWARE FROM US, ARE FACTORS IN OUR FAVOR. IF WE
DECIDE TO GO THIS ROUTE, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD START CONSULTATIONS
WITH ISRAELIS QUICKLY, SINCE MILITARY SITUATION MOVING RAPIDLY AND
WE WILL NEED TO HAVE INPUT INTO GOI DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
BEFORE POSITIONS IN CABINET ARE CRYSTALIZED.
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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 8769

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT REPEAT OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: XX
SUBJ: PRIMIN-BHUTTO ON MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

SUMMARY. BHUTTO SPECULATES THAT SOVIETS MUST HAVE KNOWN
IN ADVANCE OF EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN PLANS TO ATTACK ISRAEL,
AND THAT THEY ACQUIESCED IN SUCH PLANS. INDICATING
SKEPTICISM OVER ARAB CAPABILITIES, HE HOPES THAT OUT
OF CURRENT FIGHTING THERE WILL COME IMPROVED CHANCE
OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAEL. HE
BELIEVES USG HAS "OPPORTUNITY" TO PROMOTE SUCH OUTCOME AND
URGES US TO "PLAY IT COOL." HE SEES UNSC RES 242 AS
STILL PROVIDING BASIS FOR JUST SETTLEMENT. END SUMMARY.

1. PRIMIN BHUTTO ASKED ME TO CALL ON HIM EARLY EVENING
OCTOBER 9. THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIZES CONVERSATION ON
MIDDLE EAST CRISIS; OTHER SUBJECTS COVERED DURING
ONE AND ONE-HALF HOUR MEETING BY SEPTELS. *W/ you may have brief*

2. BHUTTO OPENED BY ASKING ABOUT SITUATION ON EGYPTIAN AND
SYRIAN FIGHTING FRONTS, STATING THAT GOP SOURCES WERE
OF LIMITED VALUE. I GAVE HIM SELECTIVE SUMMARY OF
SITUATION AS I UNDERSTOOD IT FROM SITREPS WE HAVE BEEN
RECEIVING. I SAID FIGHTING MIGHT NOW POSSIBLY BE NEARING

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
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CRUCIAL STAGE AS ISRAELIS COMPLETED MOBILIZATION AND PREPARED TO COUNTER-ATTACK WITH FULL FORCE AT THEIR DISPOSAL. I NOTED THAT BOTH EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS HAD HAD INITIAL SUCCESSES BUT OPINED THAT SITUATION WAS FAR FROM ONE-SIDED PICTURE BEING PAINTED BY PAK PRESS AND RADIO, I.E., THAT EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS WERE SEVERELY CLOBBERING "ISRAELI AGGRESSORS." BHUTTO REMARKED THAT HE HAD HAD LENGTHY CABINET MEETING ON MIDDLE EAST CRISIS EARLIER THAT DAY AND THAT, IN ATTEMPTING TO PRESENT SITUATION OBJECTIVELY, HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY SOME OF HIS MINISTERS AS BEING PRO-ISRAEL; HE DEPLORED LOCAL TENDENCY TO ONE-SIDED (PRO-ARAB) ACCOUNTS, DESPITE DEEP PRO-ARAB FEELING IN PAKISTAN.

3. BHUTTO ASKED WHETHER WE HAD HAD ANY ADVANCE WARNING. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD ISRAELIS HAD TOLD US, SOME HOURS BEFORE FIGHTING BROKE OUT, OF INDICATIONS THEY HAD OF ARAB BUILD-UP AND OF ISRAELIS' ANTICIPATION THAT ATTACK WAS IMMINENT. I ADDED THAT WE HAD UNDERTAKEN IMMEDIATE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO FORESTALL HOSTILITIES BUT WITHOUT SUCCESS. AS TO WHO HAD FIRED FIRST SHELL, I NOTED UN SOURCES HAD INDICATED ISRAELIS WERE ON RECEIVING END. BHUTTO VOLUNTEERED HIS BELIEF THAT EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS HAD BEGUN THE FIGHT; BUT THAT THEY COULD NOT PROPERLY BE TERMED "AGGRESSORS" OR "INVADERS" IN VIEW OF FACT THEY WERE SEEKING TO RECAPTURE THEIR OWN LAND OCCUPIED BY ISRAELIS.

4. BHUTTO ASKED WHAT US WANTED OUT OF THE FIGHTING. I SAID ANSWER SEEMED FAIRLY SIMPLE TO ME ALTHOUGH PROBLEM WAS NOT ONLY COMPLEX BUT DIFFICULT: CESSION OF HOSTILITIES AND BEYOND THAT, MUTUAL SETTLEMENT AND PEACE BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS. I SAID I HAD IMPRESSION WE WERE NOT MAKING MUCH OF A POINT OF FACT THAT THIS ROUND OF FIGHTING HAD BEEN BEGUN BY ARAB SIDE; IMPORTANT THING WAS TO CONTAIN SITUATION AND GET PEACE-MAKING PROCESS BEGUN IN EARNEST. BHUTTO REJOINED THAT SMALL COUNTRIES LIKE PAKISTAN COULD TALK IN BROAD TERMS ABOUT NEED FOR A JUST PEACE, BUT MAJOR POWERS COULD DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT. AT THAT POINT I WENT INTO ACCOUNT OF VARIOUS EFFORTS BY USG TO GET BOTH SIDES INTO PEACEMAKING AND

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NEGOTIATING STAGE SINCE 1967, NOTING HOWEVER OUR BELIEF THAT PEACE COULD REALLY BE MADE ONLY BY THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS THEMSELVES, WE THOUGHT THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACE WERE WELL SET OUT IN UNSC RES 242, AND WE OURSELVES HAD NOT OFFERED ANY PARTICULAR BLUEPRINT ALTHOUGH WE HAD SUGGESTED SOME SPECIFIC WAYS IN WHICH FIRST STEPS TOWARD PEACE COULD BE TAKEN. BHUTTO SAID HE AGREED RES 242 WAS SOUND (HE HAD SAID AS MUCH IN RECENT MESSAGE TO UNSYG) BUT THERE WAS PROBLEM IN ISRAELIS' REFUSAL TO GIVE UP TERRITORY THEY OCCUPIED IN 1967. AGREEING THAT WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WAS A MAJOR PENDING ISSUE, HE SAID USG HAD DECLARED CONSISTENTLY ITS SUPPORT OF PRINCIPLE OF INADMISSIBILITY OF CONQUEST OF TERRITORY BY FORCE; AT SAME TIME, OTHER MAJOR PENDING ISSUES UNDER RES 242 INCLUDED THAT OF "SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES." BHUTTO SAID HE ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE THAT SOME MINOR TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS MIGHT BE NEEDED TO ACHIEVE SUCH BOUNDARIES.

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S. BHUTTO ASKED ABOUT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN NIXON-BREZHNEV AGREEMENT DURING LAST JUNE ON NEED TO MAINTAIN PEACE. LITTLE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT CURRENT SITUATION. SEEMED RECENTLY TO HAVE BEEN EVALUATING SITUATION IN POSSIBLE BREAK OF FIGHTING; THIS WOULD INFLUENCE HIS POSITION. ON OTHER HAND, HE HAD NO INDICATION OF ACTUAL SOVIET PAKISTANI HOSTILITIES ALTHOUGH HE STRESSED HIS LITTLE KNOWLEDGE. AT THAT POINT, BHUTTO CITED REPORTS FROM PAK AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO WHICH SUGGESTED HARDER POSITION. PROBABILITY OF ACTIVE SOVIET PRESENCE IN DAMASCUS HAD RELAYED UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION. EXPERTS WERE WITH SYRIAN UNITS OF PAKISTANI ARMY. AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO HAD RELAYED INFORMATION THAT EGYPTIANS HAD EXPERT (SOVIET) ADVICE FOR THEM. HIMSELF, BHUTTO ADDED, HE THOUGHT OF ARAB PLANS TO RESUME FIGHTING IN THEM. HE THOUGHT EGYPTIANS, FOR THEIR PART, HAD ACTED ENTIRELY ON OWN INITIATIVE. AIM HAD BEEN MERELY TO TAKE CONTROL OF THE CANAL; THAT WOULD HAVE REFLECTED THE CANAL AND TO REACTIVATE WORLD

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OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, BUT FACT THAT EGYPTIANS WISH TO PUSH EASTWARD INTO SINAI BEYOND SUEZ INDICATED TO HIM THAT SOVS WERE BEHIND THAT MOVE.

6. BHUTTO EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN THAT "CHAUVINISTIC" ELEMENTS IN PAKISTAN MIGHT BE ENCOURAGED BY LOCAL REPORTS OF ARAB ADVANCES TO PRESS GOP TO REVERSE ITS EFFORTS TO EASE TENSIONS IN SUBCONTINENT. THEY MIGHT TAKE LINE THAT, IF THE ARABS CAN WIN, WHY CAN'T WE (PAKISTANIS)? THEY MIGHT LIKE TO GET GOP TO STOP ITS EFFORTS TOWARDS NORMALIZATION IN SUBCONTINENT. SOME OF THE UNREPENTENT "SWAGGER-STICK CROWD" MIGHT URGE THAT PAKISTAN SEEK REVENGE ON INDIA. BHUTTO MADE THESE REMARKS IN MANNER INDICATING HIS CONTEMPT FOR SUCH "CHAUVINISTS."

7. AT THAT POINT I EXPRESSED VERY STRONG HOPE THAT GOP WOULD NOT ALLOW ITSELF TO BECOME ACTIVELY EMBROILED IN CURRENT MIDDLE EAST FIGHTING. I REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO PAK PILOTS ATTACHED TO LIBYAN AIR FORCE. BHUTTO QUICKLY RESPONDED THAT HE HAD ALREADY TAKEN STEPS TO REMIND "OUR PEOPLE" OF UNDERSTANDING ON WHICH THEY HAD BEEN SENT TO LIBYA, I.E., THAT THEY WERE UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY HOSTILITIES. PAKISTAN ALSO HAD SOME MILITARY ADVISORS IN JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAQ; SAME PRINCIPLE APPLIED TO THEM, AND BHUTTO WAS INTENT ON KEEPING THEM OUT OF THE FIGHTING IF THOSE COUNTRIES SHOULD BECOME INVOLVED IN THE HOSTILITIES. AS FOR LIBYA, IT WAS STILL REFUSING TO COME THROUGH WITH A \$30 MILLION LOAN WHICH HAD BEEN OFFERED BEFORE BHUTTO CAME DOWN FIRMLY LAST YEAR THAT PAK PILOTS WERE TO REFRAIN STRICTLY FROM ANY ACTIVE ENGAGEMENTS ON BEHALF LIBYAN AIR FORCE (AS IN AIRSPACE OVER MEDITERRANEAN WATERS CLAIMED BY LIBYA).

8. CONVERSATION THIS SUBJECT CONCLUDED WITH BHUTTO'S STATEMENT THAT US HAS "OPPORTUNITY" TO SEE THAT CHANCES OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT EMERGE FROM PRESENT HOSTILITIES. HE SUGGESTED THERE SHOULD NOT BE INSISTENCE THAT FIGHTING CEASE BEFORE SUCH "OPPORTUNITY" IS AT HAND. (IN CONTEXT OUR DISCUSSION, IT HAD TO BE INFERRED HE MEANT

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THAT THERE SHOULD BE CLEAR TREND TO LIKELY OUTCOME
OF FIGHTING BEFORE IT WAS HALTED; AND SINCE HE HAD
DOUBTS ABOUT ARAB CAPABILITIES, IT ALSO HAD
) TO BE INFERRED THAT HE WOULD NOT MIND SEEING THE
ISRAELIS GIVE THE EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS SOME HARD
KNOCKS.) IN THIS REGARD BHUTTO UPGRD THAT, ALTHOUGH
USG MIGHT "MAKE NOISE", WE SHOULD "PLAY IT COOL,"
SOBER

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FOR SECRETARY FROM AMB. SCALI

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, SC, UN
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST

1. YUGO REP MOJSOV APPROACHED ME 15 MINUTES BEFORE SC DEBATE BEGAN, PROFESSING A DESIRE FOR MUCH CLOSER CONSULTATIONS TO AVOID FUTURE SC MEETING MIX-UPS SUCH AS THAT WHICH PRECEDED TODAY'S SESSION.

2. I REPLIED RATHER COLDLY THAT I UNDERSTOOD HE HAD BEEN AT LEAST PARTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR MISINFORMATION AND LAST-MINUTE PLOTTING WHICH DELAYED MTG.
3. HE WAS SHOCKED THAT I COULD BELIEVE THIS. I TOLD HIM I KNEW THAT HE HAD SPREAD REPORT TO OTHER SC DELEGATES, FIRST, THAT SECSTATE HAD GIVEN EL ZAYYAT ULTIMATUM IN 2:15 P.M. CONVERSATION TODAY AND AFTERWARD THAT, IN SECOND KISSINGER CONVERSATION TO EL ZAYYAT, SECSTATE AGREED TO DELETE OBJECTIONABLE PARTS OF MY SPEECH WHICH CONSTITUTED ULTIMATUM. HE VIGOROUSLY DENIED BOTH CHARGES, SAYING THAT HE ONLY REPORTED EL ZAYYAT WAS DEEPLY DISTURBED BY INITIAL KISSINGER TELEPHONE CALL AND THAT EL ZAYYAT WANTED TWO-HOUR DELAY IN MTG SO HE COULD DRAFT SUITABLE EGYPTIAN REPLY TO POSITION WHICH HE THOUGHT I WOULD LAY DOWN IN MY SPEECH. HE SAID HE NEVER USED WORD "ULTIMATUM". HOWEVER, SYG WALDHEIM TOLD AUSTRALIANS MOJSOV DID USE THAT WORD IN EXPLAINING WHY EL ZAYYAT UPSET AND WANTED MTG DELAYED. MOJSOV SAID HE WAS TOLD BY EL ZAYYAT THAT SCALI SPEECH LANGUAGE WAS CHANGED FOLLOWING SECOND KISSINGER CALL.

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Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

PAGE -2- USUN 3727, OCT 9

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2. MOJSOV, SEEKING TO MOLLIFY ME, SAID IT WAS POSSIBLE EL ZAYYAT, BECAUSE HIS UNDERSTANDING OF ENGLISH IMPERFECT, HAD MISUNDERSTOOD KISSINGER.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE -3- USUN 3727, OCT 9

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COMMENT: EVEN IF EL ZAYYAT WAS GENUINELY CONFUSED.
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Department of State
TELEGRAM

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0011

UNCLAS USUN 3759

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR, XF, UN, UR
SUBJ: USSR STATEMENT ON ME

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF OCTOBER 7 USSR STATEMENT ON ME SITUATION TRANSMITTED BY LETTER FROM USSR PERM REP MALIK TO UN SYG. STATEMENT WAS QUOTED VERBATIM IN MALIK'S OCTOBER 8 SPEECH TO SC.

QUOTE

I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ARRANGE FOR THE ATTACHED STATEMENT OF 7 OCTOBER 1973 BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO BE CIRCULATED AS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ON WHOSE AGENDA, AS YOU ARE AWARE, THIS QUESTION APPEARS.

Y. MALIK
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

THE ABSENCE OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS CAUSED A NEW OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN THAT AREA, WITH RESULTING LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE, SUFFERING AND DESTRUCTION.

THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD, WHICH HAD GREETED WITH FEELINGS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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OF RELIEF THE RECENTLY BEGUN PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL DETENTE,
ARE AGAIN CONFRONTED WITH A DANGEROUS TURN IN EVENTS.

IT IS A SECRET TO NO ONE THAT THE CAUSE OF THE SITUATION WHICH
HAS ARISEN IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS THE EXPANSIONIST POLICY
OF ISRAEL'S RULING CIRCLES.

FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, WITH THE SUPPORT AND PROTECTION
OF IMPERIALIST CIRCLES, ISRAEL HAS BEEN CONSTANTLY INFLAMING THE
SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY ITS RECKLESS AGGRESSIVE ACTS.
DISREGARDING THE DEMANDS OF WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AND OF MOST OF
THE WORLD'S STATES AND TRAMPLING ON THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER,
THE DECISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED
RULES OF INT'L LAW, THE ISRAELI RULING CIRCLES HAVE ELEVATED
VIOLENCE AND BANDITRY TO THE LEVEL OF STATE POLICY.

THWARTING ALL EFFORTS AIMED AT ESTABLISHING A JUST PEACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND COMMITTING CONSTANT ACTS OF PROVOCATION
AGAINST NEIGHBOURING ARAB STATES, THE ISRAELI MILITARY CLIQUE
HAS CONTINUED IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY TO FAN THE SMOULDERING
EMBERS OF THE MILITARY CONFLICT UNLEASHED IN THAT AREA BY TEL
AVIV IN 1967. THE ISRAELI MILITARY CLIQUE'S CEASELESS ACTS OF
ARMED PROVOCATION AGAINST EGYPT, SYRIA AND LEBANON HAVE REPEAT-
EDLY CREATED CRITICAL SITUATIONS IN THE AREA. IN THE LAST FEW
DAYS, ISRAEL HAS CONCENTRATED SURSTANTIAL ARMED FORCFS ON THE
CEASE-FIRE LINES WITH SYRIA AND EGYPT, HAS CALLED UP RESERVISTS
AND, AFTER THUS INFLAMING THE SITUATION TO THE UTMOST, HAS
LAUNCHED MILITARY OPERATIONS.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESENT TURN OF EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE
EAST AND FOR THEIR CONSEQUENCES RESTS WHOLLY AND ENTIRELY WITH
ISRAEL IN ITS AGGRESSIVE AMBITIONS.

IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT THE ARAB STATES HAVE SHOWN GREAT
RESTRAINT AND WILLINGNESS TU SEEK A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF
THE CONFLICT ON AN EQUITABLE BASIS. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ARAB
STATES' DEMANDS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF THE AGGRESSOR'S TROOPS
FROM ALL THE ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIFD IN 1967 IS RECOGNIZED
BY ALL. THFSE DEMANDS ARE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE
OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY MEANS
OF WAR, AS EMBODIED IN THE WELL-KNOWN SECURITY COUNCIL AND

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY DECISIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

HOWEVER, THE EFFORTS OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALL PEACE-LOVING FORCES TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAVE INvariably COME UP AGAINST THE OBSTRUCTIONIST POSITION ADOPTED BY TEL AVIV. THE PRESENT EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE THE DIRECT RESULT OF ISRAEL'S CONTINUING AGGRESSION.

WHAT IS NOW HAPPENING IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONCLUSIVELY CONFIRMS THE INDISPUTABLE FACT THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ELIMINATE THIS BREEDING GROUND OF CONSTANT TENSION AND ESTABLISH A RELIABLE, GUARANTEED PEACE FOR ALL THE STATES AND PEOPLES OF THE AREA UNLESS ALL THE ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL ARE COMPLETELY LIBERATED AND THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE ARAB PEOPLE OF PALESTINE ARE SECURED.

TRUE TO ITS POLICY OF GIVING SUPPORT AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE TO PEOPLES STRIVING FOR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE, THE SOVIET UNION TAKES A CONSISTENT STAND AS A RELIABLE FRIEND OF THE ARAB STATES.

CONDAMNING ISRAEL'S ANNEXATIONIST POLICY, THE SOVIET UNION VIGOROUSLY SUPPORTS THE LEGITIMATE DEMANDS OF THE ARAB STATES FOR THE LIBERATION OF ALL ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL IN 1967.

IF, A PRISONER OF ITS EXPANSIONIST AMBITIONS, THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT REMAINS DEAF TO THE VOICE OF REASON AND CONTINUES TO PURSUE A POLICY OF ANNEXATION, RETAINING THE OCCUPIED ARAB LANDS, IGNORING THE DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND DEFYING WORLD PUBLIC OPINION, THIS MAY COST THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL DEARLY. ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH AN UNREASONABLE COURSE WILL REST WITH THE LEADERS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL.

MOSCOW, 7 OCTOBER 1973
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FOR SECRETARY FROM AMB. SCALI

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EX-REF ID: A65124

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TELEGRAM

PAGE -2- USUN 3727, OCT 9

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE -3- USUN 3727, OCT 9

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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E 0 11652: XGDS-3
TAGSC MASS, US, IS
SUBJECT: F-4 DELIVERIES

FOR YOUR INFO, THIS MONTH'S DELIVERY TO ISRAEL OF F-4S IS
SCHEDULED OCTOBER 11. I JUST WANT TO BE SURE DEPT IS AWARE OF
THIS.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #14

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Situation in the Middle East as of 1200 EDT, Oct. 9, 1973

1 Israeli forces continue to hold a line six to seven kilometers to the east of the Canal with about 400 to 500 Egyptian tanks and 70,000 troops on the East bank. Israel continues its attempts to interfere with Egyptian efforts to reinforce their positions. Israeli planes have attacked Egyptian airfields deep in Egyptian territory. During a morning broadcast Israeli spokesman Herzog said that Israel was fighting a war of attrition against Egypt at the Canal in preference to pitting a heavy tank force against a numerically superior enemy. On the Golan front, after having been pushed back to the 1967 ceasefire lines, Syrian armor has mounted a counterattack north of Quneitra. Israeli planes have bombed the Syrian army and air force headquarters in Damascus. The Israelis claim that this action was taken in retaliation for Syrian Frog missile attacks on Israeli settlements.

King Hussein is under severe pressure to enter the conflict, and according to the King was advised by the Soviet Ambassador to do so. But apparently he has not yet been called on by either Syria or Egypt to become involved, though he has received an emotional message from King Faisal to this effect. Israeli Chief of Military Intelligence Zeira passed a strong threat to Hussein through our Embassies that if Jordan enters the fighting Israel will hold off the Egyptians and Syrians until it has destroyed Jordan. The King has sent a personal appeal to the Secretary indicating his deep concern and saying that a ceasefire must come as soon as possible without conditions as to status quo ante. At this point, the King apparently remains committed to staying out of the fray.

The Israeli public is becoming aware of the heavy casualties Israel has sustained, and the GOI is coming under private criticism for not having taken preemptive action. The pressure, therefore, is mounting on the GOI to thoroughly trounce the Egyptian and Syrian forces in this period just three weeks before the Israeli elections.

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GDS APPROVED BY:

Roderick M. Wright
DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR OPERATIONS



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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 HONG K 10131 090914Z

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 ISO-00 NIC-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00
PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01
PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15 USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-15 SSO-00
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FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8408
INFO USINT CAIRO
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

Chinese position

CONFIDENTIAL HONG KONG 10131

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR CH EG SY IS
SUBJ: PEKING VOICES ITS SUPPORT OF EGYPT AND SYRIA

SUMMARY. THE PRC HAS CONDEMNED ISRAEL AS THE AGGRESSOR IN THE MIDDLE EAST FIGHTING AND EXPRESSED POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE ARABS. ITS REPORTING ON THE WAR, HOWEVER, SUGGESTS THAT THE PRC DOES NOT ANTICIPATE MAJOR ARAB GAINS IN RECOVERING TERRITORY.
END SUMMARY.

1. PRC FOREIGN MINISTER CHI PENG-FEI SAID OCTOBER 8 THAT "THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE HEREBY EXPRESS STRONG INDIGNATION AT AND MOST STERN CONDEMNATION OF THIS NEW ACT OF AGGRESSION BY ISRAEL" AND THAT THE PRC STANDS "FIRMLY ON THE SIDE OF THE EGYPTIAN, SYRIAN, PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB PEOPLE AGAINST ISRAEL AGGRESSION." CHI'S COMMENTS TO THE AMBASSADORS OF EGYPT AND SYRIA AND THE PLO REPRESENTATIVES, WHO WERE CALLED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, WERE QUOTED BY NCNA ALONG WITH A SERIES OF

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PAGE 02 HDNG K 10131 090914Z

REPORTS OF THE ARAB VERSION OF THE FIGHTING IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE REPORTS EMPHASIZED THE "DEFENSIVE" NATURE OF THE ARAB ACTIONS, AND PLAYED UP THE PALESTINIAN ROLE. THEY DENOUNCED "ISRAELI ARMED AGGRESSION," SUPPORTED THE "HEROIC RESISTENCE" OF EGYPT, SYRIA, AND THE PALESTINIAN GUERRILLAS, AND EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR ARAB UNITY IN THE STRUGGLE. A PEOPLE'S DAILY "COMMENTATOR" ARTICLE OF THE SAME DAY SAID THE WAR WAS A "LONG-PLANNED ACT" DESIGNED FOR TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND TO ENABLE ISRAEL TO "IMPOSE ITS WILL UPON THE ARAB COUNTRIES AGAIN BY MEANS OF WAR." "COMMENTATOR" CONTINUED THAT THE "FRENZIED AGGRESSION OF ISRAEL" WAS THE INEVITABLE RESULT OF THE POLICIES OF THE SUPERPOWERS-- US SUPPORT FOR ISRAELI ZIONISM INCLUDING "A GREAT DEAL OF MILITARY AID" AND SOVIET MANPOWER SUPPORT BY ALLOWING LARGE NUMBER OF SOVIET JEWS TO EMIGRATE TO ISRAEL. THE ARTICLE REPEATS THE CHINESE POSITION THAT THE UNREST CONTINUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST BECAUSE OF THE "COLLUSION AND CONGENTION" OF THE SUPERPOWERS WHO WISH TO MAINTAIN AND EXPAND THEIR RESPECTIVE SPHERES OF INFLUENCE.

2. COMMENT. CHINESE DIPLOMATS AT THE UN CAN OF COURSE BE EXPECTED TO ADOPT THIS LINE AND, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME, PORTRAY CHINA AS THE TRUE FRIEND OF THE ARABS. THE CHINESE ARE HOPING FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO WEDGE THEMSELVES BETWEEN THE ARABS AND THE SOVIETS. IN PARTICULAR, THEY SEEM TO BE LAYING THE GROUNDWORK TO DENOUNCE ANY SETBACK FOR THE ARABS AS THE PRODUCT OF SOVIET-US COLLUSION. EGYPTIAN VICE PRESIDENT HUSSEIN EL SHAFEI DURING HIS VISIT TO PEKING IN LATE SEPTEMBER MAY HAVE GIVEN THE CHINESE SOME INDICATION OF ARAB OBJECTIVES. IN ANY EVENT, THE TONE OF THE CHINESE REPORTING ON THE CONFLICT SUGGESTS THAT THE PRC DOES NOT ANTICIPATE MAJOR ARAB GAINS IN RECOVERING TERRITORY. GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, CHINA'S PLEDGES OF SUPPORT APPEAR CAUTIOUSLY FRAMED AND DO NOT SUGGEST ANY MAJOR MATERIAL ASSISTANCE MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 JFRUSA 01082 091116Z

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-25 AF-10 IO-15 CIAE-00 DODE-00
PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01
PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15 USIA-15 ACDA-19 SSO-00 NSCE-00

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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM 1082

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, JO, IS
SUBJECT: QUESTION OF JORDANIAN PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES

1. I CALLED OCT 9 ON ANWAR KHATIB, PRINCIPAL KING'S MAN ON WEST BANK, TO SEE HOW HE FELT ABOUT QUESTION OF JORDANIAN PARTICIPATION IN CURRENT HOSTILITIES. KHATIB, AS HE REMINDED ME, HAD BEEN ONE OF THOSE WHO URGED KING TO ENTER 1967 WAR, BEFORE I HAD CHANCE TO RAISE QUESTION, KHATIB LAUNCHED INTO STRONG ARGUMENT AGAINST JORDANIAN ENTRY INTO WAR AND SAID HE FERVENTLY HOPED KING WOULD HOLD TO HIS PRESENT COURSE AND STAY OUT. FROM POINT OF VIEW OF WEST BANKERS, KHATIB SAID, JORDANIAN ENTRY WOULD BE DISASTER. ISRAELIS WOULD TURN ON THEM IN PROCESS OF DEALING WITH JORDAN AND THEIR LIVES WOULD BECOME MUCH MORE DIFFICULT AND UNPLEASANT. SECONDLY, ISRAELIS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY WIND UP HOLDING MORE JORDANIAN TERRITORY. I ASKED HIM WHETHER THESE VIEWS REFLECTED OPINION GENERALLY ON WEST BANK AND HE SAID HE BELIEVED THEY DID. HE MADE SAME POINT LATER ON AS OTHER LOCAL DIGNITARIES GATHERED IN HIS OFFICE AND GOT NO ARGUMENT FROM THEM.

2. COMMENT: KING MIGHT FEEL THAT HE DOESN'T NEED AMERICANS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 JERUSA 01082 091116Z

TO TELL HIM HOW HIS WEST BANKERS REGARD JORDANIAN POLICY,
BUT IF EMBASSY BELIEVES IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ITS EFFORTS TO
KEEP JORDAN ON ITS PRESENT COURSE, THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM
IN QUOTING KHATIB AND REPRESENTING HIS VIEWS AS REFLECTIVE
OF WIDE WEST BANK OPINION (WHICH I BELIEVE THEM TO BE).
I ASSUME KHATIB HAS WAY OF MAKING HIS OPINIONS KNOWN IN AMMAN,
BUT MIGHT DO NO HARM TO ADD THIS POINT TO OTHERS EMBASSY
MAY BE USING.
DAY

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29

75-11 HAK
SCOWCROFT
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FBIS 103

BRITISH PAPER CLAIMS MOSCOW WARNED TEL AVIV OF ATTACK

L091325 LONDON DAILY EXPRESS IN ENGLISH 9 OCT 73 P 1 L

(CHAPMAN PINCHER ARTICLE: "MOSCOW TIPPED OFF TEL AVIV")

(TEXT) IN AN ASTONISHING POLITICAL MOVE, THE RUSSIANS GAVE ISRAEL THREE DAY'S WARNING OF THE ARAB ATTACK.

THE KREMLIN HAS NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

SO THE WARNING THAT EGYPT AND SYRIA WERE PLANNING TO LAUNCH A MAJOR OFFENSIVE WAS GIVEN THROUGH A FRENCH INTERMEDIARY, IT WAS DISCLOSED LAST NIGHT.

THE KREMLIN, WHICH DOES NOT WANT OPEN WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST, HOPED THAT IF THE ISRAELIS REACTED BY IMMEDIATE MOBILIZATION THE ARABS WOULD SCRAP THEIR PLANS.

ADVISERS (SUBHEAD)

BUT EITHER THE ISRAELIS MISJUDGED THE PRECISE TIMING OF THE ASSAULT OR THEY DECIDED THAT IT WOULD SUIT THEM POLITICALLY TO LET THE ARABS ATTACK AND BE BRANDED A SFOOLHARDY AGGRESSORS.


THE KREMLIN TIP-OFF CAME ON THURSDAY AFTER RUSSIAN MOVES TO PERSUADE THE ARABS NOT TO ATTACK WERE REBUFFED.

THE RUSSIANS ORGANIZED A MASSIVE AIRLIFT OF 20 FLIGHTS TO EVACUATE THEIR FAMILIES FROM EGYPT AND SYRIA, DOING IT IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE BOUND TO SEE ITS SIGNIFICANCE.

THESE FACTS, GIVEN EXCLUSIVELY TO THE DAILY EXPRESS BY A TOP-LEVEL SOURCE, CONFIRM THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S CLAIM THAT IT WAS NOT TAKEN COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE.

FOR ONCE THE ARAB ATTACK WAS LAUNCHED THE ISRAELI ORDER OF THE DAY WAS: DEFEAT THE SYRIANS FIRST, THEN TURN ROUND AND CLOBBER THE EGYPTIANS.

9 OCT 1546Z PK/WP



73 war

Department of State

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SECRET 571

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-73 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 1026 R

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH

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SECRET STATE 199800

EXDIS

E.O. 11052: GDS
TAGS: MUPS, SA, JO, UN
SUBJ: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO KING HUSSEIN

REF: AMMAN 5363, 5367, 5368

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

1. AT YOUR MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN TUESDAY MORNING,
YOU SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE
SECRETARY TO THE KING.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

YOUR MAJESTY:

YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED MY PERSONAL MESSAGE OF A FEW
HOURS AGO, BUT SINCE THEN I HAVE RECEIVED AMBASSADOR
BROWN'S REPORT OF HIS LATEST TALK WITH YOU, AND AS A
FRIEND AND A GREAT ADMIRER, I WANT TO LOSE NO TIME IN
SENDING YOU THESE FURTHER THOUGHTS.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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
I AM ACUTELY AWARE OF THE PRESSURES ON YOUR MAJESTY RESULTING FROM THE CURRENT DIFFICULT SITUATION. YOUR DECISION TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT IN THE CURRENT HOSTILITIES IS AN ACT OF RESPONSIBLE STATESMANSHIP. I BELIEVE HISTORY WILL RECOGNIZE THE SERVICE YOU HAVE PERFORMED

BOTH TO YOUR PEOPLE AND COUNTRY BY RESISTING THE PRESSURES OF THE MOMENT. I AGREE FULLY WITH AND APPRECIATE YOUR PROMPT DECISION TO TURN ASIDE KING FAISAL'S REQUEST TO MOVE SAUDI FORCES FROM JORDAN TO SYRIA. I URGE YOU TO MAINTAIN THE STEADFAST POSITION THAT YOU HAVE TAKEN ON ALL THESE MATTERS.

I BELIEVE IT OUGHT TO BE POSSIBLE FOR THE FIGHTING TO END SOON. OUR RECOGNITION OF THE PROBLEM THAT THE HOSTILITIES ARE CAUSING FOR YOUR MAJESTY WAS A MAJOR FACTOR IN OUR DECISION TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN CONVENING THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WITH A VIEW TO SEEKING AN EARLY END OF THE FIGHTING. CANDIDLY, YOUR MAJESTY, IT IS INEXPLICABLE TO US WHY YOUR ARAB COLLEAGUES AND MANY OF THE NON-ALIGNED HAVE BEEN DELAYING CONSIDERATION OF THIS MATTER IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. AMBASSADOR SCALI HAS EXPRESSED OUR IDEAS IN THE COUNCIL THIS EVENING, AND I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE READY TO MOVE IN THE COUNCIL ALONG THE LINES HE HAS INDICATED. WITH RESPECT TO A SIMPLE CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE, IT SHOULD BE POINTEO OUT THAT EGYPT HAS CONSISTENTLY STATED THAT IT WAS NOT INTERESTED IN SUCH A PROPOSITION. OUR

REFERENCE TO AN EVENTUAL RETURN TO POSITIONS HELD PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF CURRENT HOSTILITIES WOULD APPLY ALSO IN THE EVENT ISRAELI FORCES SHOULD PENETRATE BEYOND THE 1967 CEASEFIRE LINES.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT WE SHOULD, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, USE THE PRESENT COUNCIL MEETING TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR GETTING MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS GOING ON A FUNDAMENTAL SETTLEMENT. WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK TO THIS END. IN FACT, AS YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER HAS UNDOUBTEDLY REPORTED TO YOU, I HAD ALREADY BEGUN EXPLORATIONS IN NEW YORK LAST WEEK, AND IT IS MY UTMOST DESIRE THAT FROM THIS CONFLAGRATION SOME NEW IMPELUS TOWARD PEACE WILL



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RESULT.

YOUR FRIENDSHIP FOR THE UNITED STATES IS RECIPROCATED
IN THE FULLEST MEASURE. PLEASE COMMUNICATE WITH ME AT
ANY TIME, FOR YOUR CONCERNS ARE OUR CONCERNS.

SINCERELY,

HENRY A. KISSINGER

END TEXT, KISSINGER

RECORDED, INDEXED, SERIALIZED, FILED



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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 SSN-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01
PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15 USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-15 USSS-00
DRC-01 /142 N

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R 091635Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1206
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

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CONFIDENTIAL ROME 10838

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, IT
SUBJECT: ISRAELI AND ARAB DEMARCHE TO ITALIANS; EC MID EAST EXPERTS
TO MEET

DEPT PASS US INT CAIRO

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: ITALIANS HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY ARABS AND
ISRAELIS FOR SUPPORT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS IN CURRENT MID
EAST CONFLICT. EC MID EAST EXPERTS WILL CONFER IN COPENHAGEN
PRIOR TO POLITICAL DIRECTORS MEETING ON OCTOBER 11. END SUMMARY.

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2. ON OCTOBER 8 RESPONSIBLE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL (PROTECT) INFORMED US THAT ISRAELIS, EGYPTIANS, SYRIANS AND KUWAITIS HAD APPROACHED FOREIGN MINISTRY OCTOBER 8 RE MID EAST CONFLICT. OFFICIAL SAID ALL WERE OPERATING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS, AND HE ASSUMED SIMILAR DEMARCHEES BEING MADE IN MANY CAPITALS.

3. ACCORDING SOURCE, ISRAELI DEMARCHE EXPRESSED "EXPECTATION" THAT ITALIANS WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT SUPPORT ANY INITIATIVE IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS, "PARTICULARLY UN AND SECURITY COUNCIL", WHICH WOULD PERMIT ARABS, "WHO HAD CLEARLY TAKEN MILITARY INITIATIVE", TO RETAIN TERRITORIAL ADVANTAGES DERIVED FROM THEIR "AGGRESSIVE" ACTION.

4. OFFICIAL STATED THAT ARABS, IN REQUESTING ITALIAN SUPPORT, TOOK LINE THAT ISRAEL WAS AGGRESSOR, AND EGYPTIAN REP HAD CITED ARTICLE 51 OF UN CHARTER AS BASIS FOR EGYPTIAN IN "SELF-DEFENSE", SOURCE STATED THAT MINISTRY, WITHOUT TAKING ANY POSITION, HAD TAKEN OPPORTUNITY TO REMIND ARAB REPS THAT THERE WAS A WELL-PUBLICIZED AND GENERAL BELIEF THAT ARABS HAD TAKEN MILITARY INITIATIVE. DURING CONVERSATION, SYRIAN CHARGE, PHONED OFFICIAL TO INFORM HIM THAT ISRAELI AIR FORCE WAS "CYNICALLY ATTACKING" CIVILIAN TARGETS IN SYRIA.

5. OFFICIAL SAID MINISTRY'S RESPONSE TO BOTH ISRAELI AND ARAB REPRESENTATIONS WAS THAT ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S FIRST PRIORITY WAS IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES.

6. CONTRASTING WIL MOST MEDIA REPORTS AVAILABLE TO ITALIAN PUBLIC, ROME PRESS OCTOBER 9 CARRIED STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO ARAB AMBASSADORS ACCREDITED TO ITALY AND VATICAN ACCUSING ISRAEL OF "PREMEDITATED AGGRESSION" ON OCTOBER 6. STATEMENT ASSERTED THAT EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS HAD UNDERTAKEN THEIR "LEGITIMATE DUTY" IN REPELLING THIS AGGRESSION. STATEMENT CALLED ON "FRIENDLY ITALY" TO SUPPORT THE ARAB PEOPLES IN PUTTING AN END TO "ISRAELI MILITARY EXPANSION". ARAB AMBASSADORS CITED EBAN PRONOUNCEMENT THAT ISRAELIS WOULD CONTINUE FIGHTING UNTIL THEY RECOVERED CONTROL OF TERRITORIES CONQUERED IN 1967 AND CALLED ON ITALIANS TO SUPPORT ARABS IN RECOVERING OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. STATEMENT ALSO POINTED OUT THAT ITALIAN SUPPORT OF ARABS WOULD HASTEN THE DAY WHEN MEDITERRANEAN WOULD AGAIN BECOME A "SEA OF PEACE", AND SUEZ CANAL

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WOULD BE REOPENED.

7. ON ANOTHER SUBJECT IN RESPONSF TO QUERY, SOURCE SAID THAT EC
MID EAST EXPERTS WOULD MEET IN COPENHAGEN PRIOR TO POLITICAL
DIRECTORS MEETING ON OCTOBER 11. HE REITERATED EXPECTATION THAT
LITTLE WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED ON MID EAST CRISIS DURING EC
DELIBERATIONS (REFTEL). BEAUDRY

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